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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The city of Tientsin is situated in northern China at the junc tion 
of the Peiho (River) and the Yuho (the Grand Canal). Its latitude is 
approximately 39 degrees north with a longitude of about 117 degrees 
east.
1 
The unique thing about Tientsin in 1900 was that it was ac -
tually two totally separate cities. Tientsin City , or the Native City, 
was surrounded by a large wall built in 1405. The wall was about thirty 
feet thick and about twenty-five feet high. The sides of it were faced 
wjth brick work four to five feet thick and the center was filled with 
dirt . A brick parapet about five feet high capped the wall, and gates 
were situated in the center of each side. Over these gates and in the 
four corners were built two storied buildings which served as look-out 
stations and added a very ornamental effect. Buildings inside the 
Native City were very close together. The streets were narrow, and 
transit and public utilities were very poor. 2 Outside the walls of the 
1
Noah F. Drake , 11 Map and Short Description of Tientsin," (unpub-
lished printed booklet, in Stanford University Library), p. 1. H. B. 
Morse in The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 3 vols. 
(London: Longmans Green and Co., 1918), 1:241, on map lists the river 
as the Haiho. 
2
Gordon Casserly, The Land of the Boxers: Or China Under the 
All i es (London: Green and Company, 1903), p. 17. 
Native City were extensive suburbs in which a large part of the native 
population lived. Surrounding the suburbs of t he Native City was a mud 
wall which had been construc t ed in 1858 as a defense against for-
. 3 
e~gners. 
Two miles down the Peiho was si tuated the Tientsin Foreign City . 
It resembled a European town rather than an alien settlement in th e 
heart of the Chinese Empire. It had wide roads and well kept streets, 
lar ge offices and huge warehouses. It also had good publi c buildings 
and comfortable villas, a horse racing track and a polo ground. The 
city hall, known as Gordon Hall, named for General Charles Gordon who 
laid out the British Concession, was the leading architectural struc-
ture in the foreign city . Victoria Park was a beautiful area which 
had been developed within a treeless, marshy, alkaline area of the 
foreign city. Most of the buildings in the area were located in those 
parts of the concession closest to the river. In 1900 only the British, 
French, Japanese and Germans had concess ions in Tientsin. 4 Most of the 
banks and o ffices of the largest merchants were located in the British 
concession. 5 
By 1900 Tientsin had approximately one million people and because 
it was a center for trade, it had become an impor tant city to China, 
both politically and economically. Its growth to political importance 
3
Henry Neil, Startling Experiences in the Three Wars; in China , the 
Ph i lippines, South Africa (Chicago: Marshall Everett, 1900) , pp . 85- 86. 
4
orake, "Map and Short Description of Tientsin, " pp . 2-3. 
5
casserly, The Land of the Boxers, p. 17. 
apparently dates back to the f i r st year of the reign of the Ming emperor 
Yung-lo, in 1403. At that time it became a wei, or fortified post. In 
the third year of Yung Ching, 1726, it became a chou, or sub-perfectoral 
city, six years later becoming a~' or capital city of the province 
of Chihli. 6 Economically, the city had been important as a trade 
center for over a thousand years. 
It was not until 1863 that the area was opened to foreign trade, 
the British becoming the first foreign power to become active there. 
From that time on foreign activity in the area increased. In 1900 that 
influence was to be seriously challenged by a Chinese anti-foreign move-
ment known as the Boxers. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze 
the influence of the foreigners in Tientsin, show how this influence 
added to the Boxers' anti-foreign feeling, and narrate the events that 
occurred as a result of this collision of two cultures. The sources 
for this paper are English language materials written by foreigners, 
and thereby, run the risk of being partial to foreign interests. Even 
with this in mind, it will be made clear that the integrity of the 
Chinese and the respect which they deserved from the foreign in trud ers 
was almost totally ignored during and after the Boxer uprising. The 
fight by the armed forces of the powers to put down the Boxers gave the 
foreigners a ready excuse to further their influence around Tientsin. 
This imperialistic lack of respect shown by the powers for China and 
the Chinese becomes the principal theme of this paper. 
6
orake, "Map and Short Description of Tientsin, " p . 1. 
CHAPTER II 
FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN TIENTSIN, 1900 
The biggest foreign influence in and around the city of Tientsin 
was in the area of trade. Tientsin, because of its geographic location 
had for years been a major trading center in China. This was due to 
the sys tem of navigable waterways branching from Tientsin, especially 
the Grand Canal, built over 1300 years ago . At an early date Tientsin 
had become a flourishing trade center, with the transferring of cargoes 
the most frequent form of employment of the people in the city. 1 The 
fact that it was the port city of Peking helped contribute to the vol-
ume of trade . From about March 10 to about November 20, when the water-
ways froze over, Tientsin was a bustling city, the trade outlet for the 
whole of the northwestern provinces of China. The ten to twelve miles 
of waterway within the city were filled with riverboats, with thousands 
of Chinese filling the walkways of the trading area, carrying bundles 
of commerce to and from boats. 2 
It was this potential for trade that made the Tientsin area es -
pecially enticing to the greedy foreign merchants, who were by 1900 a 
major influence in the area. The first foreign concessions were not 
granted, however, until after the ratifying of the Treaty of Tientsin 
in 1860. In accordance with the terms of the treaty, the Chinese 
1
orake, "Map and !hart Description of Tientsin ," p. 1. 
2 Ibid ., p. 2. 
superintendent of Northern Trade laid out three tracts of land. These 
tracts were to be for the use of British, French and American residents~ 
The British concession was th e f irs t to have its boundaries laid, that 
taking place in December 1860. The French concession was granted in 
June 1861. It was located just above the British concession . The 
United States never did take active jurisdiction over the area set 
aside for it, though some Americans bought property within the area 
directly from Chinese owners. 4 On October 12, 1880 the area was rele-
gat e d to its former status, "with t he understanding that if at some 
future time it shall become desirable to establish suitable municipal 
re gulations there i n it shall be competent for the consular authority to 
do so." On June 25, 1896 the United States officially abandoned all 
rights to any jurisdiction in Tientsin, an act that was later to be re-
gretted . 5 
What ever disdain shown by the United States for gaining land in 
Chin a previous to 1900 was made up for by Britain, France and late r 
Germany and Japan. Britain gained control of additional land on March 
31, 1897, the new territory be coming known as the "extra concession. " 
The term extra-concession was somewhat a misnomer since the new area 
3
rnspectorate General of Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade , 
Navigation , Industries , etc . , of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce 
in China and Corea, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty 
Port Provinces, 1892- 1901 (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1902). 
4Ibid . , p. 575. 
5
u. S. Department of State, U. S. Foreign Relations , 1901 (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 50. 
was not granted in perpetuity such as was acquired in the original con-
cession . The old American concession was also turned over to Britain 
and became known as the "British Southern Extension. " 6 In April 1896 
a morement was started by France to expand the area of its concession . 
Two problems faced agreement to the expansion . One, France had to con-
vince the Chinese to agree to it. Two, British subjects lived within 
the area desired by France, and Britain sought to protect the rights 
of these citizens . Action was not taken on this until after the Boxer 
troubles. 7 
The original German concession was not made until an agreement 
was reached with the Chinese on October 30, 1895. It skirts the Peiho 
south of the British Southern Extension . The terms of the lease were 
the usual lease in perpetuity, subject only to the payment of a land 
tax, as was the case in the other . 8 cmcess 1ons. The Japanese had the 
only other concession open before 1900. In the protocol signed between 
Japan and China at Peking October 19, 1896, authority was given for 
settlements for the exclusive use of Japan in all the Chinese Treaty 
ports. In accordance with this provision, a strip of land was set 
aside for the Japanese. 9 
Thus a rather large portion of a rea in the immediate vicinity of 
Tien tsin was under the control of foreign powers. Other countries such 
6
nccennial Reports, 1892-1901, p. 574. 
7Ibid., p. 576 . 
8Ibid . 
9Ibid., p. 577. 
Figure 1. Foreign Concession in Tientsin. 

as Belgium, Austria, Russia md Italy were showing increased interest in 
obtaining a piece of the action for themselves. The United States, 
though not holding control of land, had a commercial representative at 
Tientsin. \·lith the growing importance of the interests of the various 
foreign powers in Tientsin, several of the home governments took steps 
to recognize the development of trade by raising the status of their 
consuls in Tientsin from the position of consulate to consulate 
general. 10 
Because trade was by far the largest influence foreigners had in 
Tientsin, a brief s ummary of the most important goods for trade is in 
order here. By 1900, cotton piece goods had become the largest arti-
cle of foreign import into Tientsin. England and the United States led 
in amounts imported, with the United States representing about half of 
this branch of the trade. 11 Japan and India also sold cotton in Tient-
sin, with United Stat es (U. S.) goods considered to be superior to all 
others. Chinese preferred them to all others because they dyed better . 
Also, because freight from New York was usually cheaper than charges 
from England on similar goods, U. S. cloth was less expensive to the 
Chinese . Yet another factor was the advancement of U. S. technology 
which had developed what was known as the Northrup Automatic Loom. 
This made it possible for American factories to use only one man per 
twenty looms while in England it was a one man to four loom ratio. 12 
lOibid., pp. 572-73 . 
11
u. S. Congr ess, House, Commercial Relations of the United States 
with Foreign Countries during the year 1899, H. Doc. 481, pt 1, 56th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 854. 
12
necennial Reports, 1892-1901, p. 533. 
Thus the American manufacturer in competition with his English counter-
part saved much in the amount spent for wages . 
Kerosene and sugar were also important imports into Tientsin . 
These came mostly from the United States and Russia. 13 The most impor-
tant sundries imported were sugar, matches (mostly from Japan), 
wines and liquors, cigarettes, needles and hardware. 14 A large percen-
tage of goods coming to Tientsin from the United States were not brought 
directly, but came to China at Shanghai and Hong Kong, and were then 
brought to Tientsin . There was a great competition among the foreign 
countries in the import trade. United States Consul James W. Ragsdale 
called for his country to improve its trade. He said this could be 
done only" . .. by sending good, live and responsible Americans," to 
handl e the trade instead of relying on foreign agents. He pointed out 
that Germany was preparing to send her own agents, and was also pre-
paring to publish a paper in the Chinese language to advertise their 
product.
16 
Ragsdale also pointed out that United States manufactured 
goods were constantly being counterfeited. Such items as Fairbanks 
scales and Columbia bicycles were being made by the Japanese and sold 
in China for about half t he price of the genuine ar t icle. Germany also 
l3u . S . Congress, Commercial Relations 1899, p . 855. 
14
oecennial Reports, 1892-1901, p. 533. 
15
u. S. Congress, House, Cons~lar Reports, September 1898, H. Doc 
565 , pt. , 1, 55th Gong., 2d sess, Vol. LVIII , No. 216, p. 554. 
16Ibid. , p. 555. 
got into the counterfeiting act by making a graphophone and selling 
it in Tientsin as a genuine Edison. Consul Ragsdale described it as 
indeed a poor imitation, 1117 
10 
Although the import trade was large and important, the export busi-
ness was distinctly the most significant and characteristic of Tientsin. 
From 1891 to 1900 the export trade from Tientsin had doubled, despite 
some ve ry unfavorable conditions. In 1900, the seven leading exports 
were: l) sheep's wool, 2) goat skins, 3) straw braid, 4) coal, 5) 
bris tles, 6) skin rugs of goat, sheep and lamb, and 7) ground nuts. 18 
Most of these goods came from the province of Lanchau, on the borders 
of Tibet, and the province of Hsi-Ning, further to the northeast. The 
goods came down the Yellow River, and through the Khaupingkhau and 
Nankhou passes, both of which were dominated from Peking. 19 In the 
native city of Tientsin could be found such items as choice silks, or 
rich furs from Manchuria and Korea. 20 
Thus it was trade that was the biggest mterest to foreigners and 
their governments, and trade that brought most fore i gners to Tientsin . 
As could be expected, those outsiders who invaded China after 1860 were 
not content simply to engage in activities related to trade. Foreign 
influence in Tientsin by 1900 was being felt in many other ways. Some 
of this influence was of a positive nature in that it tended to improve 
17Ibid. 
18
oecennial Reports. 1892-1901, p. 553. 
19
H. Thompson, China and t he Powers , A Narrative of the Outbreak of 
1900 (London: Longmans and Green and Co., 1902), p. 141. 
20
casserly, Land of the Boxers, p. 18. 
11 
living conditions. For the most part, however, any improvements that 
were made were in the area of the Tientsin foreign city, and were cer-
tainly of no real value to the Chinese themselves, unless , of course, 
they were employed in the fore i gn city and were able to take advantage 
of any convenience afforded them because of where they worked. An ex-
ample of modern improvements in 1900 was the construction of a new 
water system, the pipes being sent to Tientsin from New York. Also a 
new gas works was constructed. 21 Both of these served mainly the area 
around the foreign settlements. Further improvements included the 
planting of trees and the improving of streets. 
Foreign influence and pressure was especially strong regarding the 
problem of silting in the waterways near Tientsin. Volume of water in 
the Peiko had been decreasing since 1890. The river had been deep, 
with a rapid current, and ocean going steamers were able to come right 
up to the foreign settlements to unload their cargoes. 22 But because 
of factors of geology and extensive canal and irrigation projects, 
built mostly after 1890, the river's volume was steadily decreasing. 
Geology was a factor in that the rivers of northern China contain large 
deposits of sediments, which rapidly fill the Gulf of Pechili into 
which the Peiho flows. This causes a natural lessening in depth of 
water which caused pr oblems to larger ffiips traveling the area. Wi t h 
the advent of new canals and irrigation works, the water levels were 
further diminished. 23 By 1900, the larger vessels wer e forced to stay 
21 
U. S . Congress, Consular Reports 1898, p. 551 . 
22Ibid. 
23
orake, "Map and Short Description of Tinetsin," p. 1. 
12 
outside of the shallow bar at Taku, 13 miles out to sea. The goods of 
these ships had to be unloaded onto tugs and barges, so as to make the 
trip up to Tinetsin, creating much more expense for shippers. In 1898, 
foreign shippers began demanding that consular officials lead a move-
ment to gain access to the necessary funds to do something about the 
problem. It was determined that $162,500 would be necessary to im-
prove the waterways. Of this amount, the Viceroy of Chihli agreed 
to provide $65,000, and the consular bodies secured the remainder by 
means of a loan which was to be repaid from monies received from a 
newly levied landing tax, by authority of the French and English munic -
ipalities. The scheme had the approval of the diplomatic body of 
Peking. 24 
Schools in and around Tientsin were definitely under foreign in-
fluence . In the 1880's, Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin, Gustav 
Detring, persuaded Viceroy Li Hung-chang to give his sanction for the 
acquisition of a tract of land below the foreign settlement for the 
purpose of building a university. Funds were contributed by Chinese 
officials and Europeans, and in 1887 the main building of what became 
known as Tientsin University was erected. 25 But, Viceroy Li had a 
change of heart and refused to let the university open. It thus stood 
vacant for eight years and became known as "Detring's folly." 
24 
U. S . Congress, Consular Reports, 1898, p. 551. 
25
From Charles D. Tenney, "The Government Schools of Chihli 
Province," quoted in Decennial Reports 1892-1901, p. 566. 
Dr. Charles D. Tenney, who had been a United States Vice-consul to 
Tientsin, and who had organized a private school for Chinese you ths, 
became president of the new university 1895, after the war with Japan 
had changed the minds of Chinese officials. Thus Tientsin University 
began its operation. 26 
13 
The curriculum at the new university was based totally on European 
concepts. Four years of preparatory English and nnthematics were re-
quired. After those four years, the student advanced to the collegiate 
level or advanced study. The last three years study, the students 
could choose to specialize in either European law or in a branch of 
engineering. The students were admitted to the various departments by 
competitive examinations . In each area of specialization a foreign 
professor was in charge, assisted by Chinese professors. The govern-
rnent of the university was solely in the hands of the president and two 
Chinese directors . Total budget of the university in 1898 was $39,000, 
all of which was paid by the Chinese government. In 1898, 250 students 
attended the university. 27 The Chinese rejected until after 1900 a 
scheme to open foreign influenced preparatory schools in the surround -
ing area. It would have been the purpose of these schools to get stu-
dents r eady to attend Tientsin University . The influence of foreigners 
in the educational system near Tientsin was to be of s upreme importance 
in the coming of the Boxer uprising, for it attacked the very fiber of 
26
rbid., pp. 556-57. Also discussed in Consular Report s , 1898, 
p. 551.--
27Discussed in bo t h Decennial Reports , 1892-1901 , p. 569 and 
Consular Reports , 1898 , pp. 551-52. 
traditional Chinese culture. Charles Tenney himself said that "When 
the Boxers took charge of affairs in Chihli, they gave out as their 
programme at Tientsin, first, the destruction of the railway station, 
and, second, that of the University." 28 
Had it not been for the foreign influence, railroads would not 
even have been in China in 1900. The double line of track between 
14 
Tientsin and Peking had just been completed in 1899 (actually the line 
stopped at Machaipu, just outside the walls of the capital). On the 
seaward side of Tientsin were twenty-seven miles of single track reach-
ing as far as Tangku, almost due east. This line was extremely impor-
tant as a trade route because of the problem of low water in the river 
routes.
29 
Thus Tientsin was an important railroad center. Although 
the Chinese government controlled the management of the main lines, it 
was the foreigners who were responsible for their presence in China, 
since it was from the outside that capital and know how was gained to 
build the railroads. The railroads became a symbol of foreign exploita-
tion to the Boxers. 30 It was for this reason that some of the earliest 
Boxer activities near Tientsin were aimed at the railroad lines and 
sta tions. 
The realm of foreign influence that was the initial spark in set-
ting off the Boxer movement were the Christian missionary activities 
28
From Tenney, "Government Schools," quoted in Decennial Reports, 
1892-1901, p. 567. 
29 
U. S. Congress, Commercial Relations 1899, p. 867. 
30
chester C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 55. 
15 
in China. Missionary activity was prominent in and around Tientsin . 
As an example, a new Roman Catholic cathedra l had been completed in the 
native city of Tientsin in 1897. A large Methodist Episcopal church 
had been built in the foreign city of Tientsin. 31 Jesuit and Lazarist 
missionaries owned much of the property within the French sector of 
the foreign city.
32 
Although much of the mission activity and result-
ing violence took place in the outlying areas of Shantung and Chihli 
provinces, there is no doubt that the negative influences were felt 
within Tientsin. A notice written by the Boxers and widely distributed 
in Tientsin clearly shows the attitude of the Boxers towards the Chris-
tian religion as applied to the Chinese culture. It read as follows: 
On account of the protestant and Catholic religions, the 
Buddhist gods are oppressed, and our sages thrust into the 
background. The law of Buddha is no longer respected and the 
five relationships are disregarded. The anger of Heaven and 
Earth has been aroused and the timely rain has been conse-
quently withheld from us. But heaven is now sending down 
eight millions of spiritual soldiers to extirpate these 
foreign religions, and when this is done there will be a 
timely rain. In a short time there will be an encounter of 
weapons, and the soldiers and people will suffer calamity. 
People ought to hasten to join the Buddhist faith as soon as 
possible. The Yi Ho Tuan can protect the government and give 
peace and protection to the people, and parents and people 
having seen this notice must make it known to others and thus 
avoid calamity to their families. Those who fail to publish 
it will suffer. If the foreign religions are not destroyed 
there will be no rain.33 
31
Frederick Brown, From Tientsin to Peking with the Allied Forces 
(London : Charles H. Kelly, 1902), p. 45. 
32Thompson, China and The Powers, p. 136. 
33Peking and Tientsin Times, March 3, 1900, p . 2. 
16 
It is obvious from this that the missionary movement of the Cahto-
lic and Protestant churches were considered to be the worst enemy by 
the Boxers. And Tientsin itself was influenced by the foreign re~ 
ligions. 
It is apparent that Tientsin came under the spell of the foreign-
ers in many ways. It should not be surprising , therefore, that Tient-
sin should be the scene of some of the fiercest and most violent 
occurrences during the so-called Boxer uprising. It was this foreign 
influence that brought about the general uprising by the Chinese a -
gainst the foreign intruders. And Tientsin was to play a major and 
significant part in the events that took place in 1900. 
CHAPTER III 
SEIGE: THE BOXERS IN TIENTSIN 
The first reports of the l Ho Ch'uan, known as the Boxers to 
Westerners, were in 1898. Most of the disturbances created by the 
Boxers were in the area of the southern border between Shantung and 
Chihli provinces. 1 From there the movement spread eventually to the 
very confines of Tientsin itself. As early as December, 1899, the 
17 
United States Consul to Tientsin, J. W. Ragsdale, had been in touch with 
Yu Lu, Viceroy of Chihli, concerning the Boxers. When Boxer activity 
increased in Chihli, Ragsdale demanded that Yu Lu do something to sup-
press that activity. Yu Lu immediately issued a proclamation ordering 
the Boxers to stop causing problems, but these were immediately torn 
down.
2 
Ragsdale was unhappy because he felt the de tachments sen t to 
carry out Yu Lu's proclamation were too small. At any rate, the de-
tachments were quite ineffectual, and the Boxers were able to continue 
to cause problems. 3 
The Boxer movement continued to grow and on December 5 , 1899, 
the North China Daily News ran an article which predic t ed that unless 
something was done, terror and threat to foreign lives would continue. 
1
Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe, p. 52. 
2
u. S . Congress, House, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States with the Annual Message of the President, H. Doc. 
1, 76th Gong., 2d sess . , p. 268. 
3Ibid. 
18 
It also called for stronger action in dealing with the Boxers and said, 
"There is but one method of successfully dealing with such risings , 
which is to put them out before they have made headway."4 By January 
the Tientsin and Peking Times reported that a serious Boxer outbreak 
had occured in Chinghai, only twenty-five miles from Tientsin. It also 
reported that it had learned that the Boxers were organizing within the 
confines of Tientsin Native City. 5 A week later the paper was calling 
for the sending of gunboats to North China by the Western powers to 
combat the Boxers. The press was severely critical of the Chinese 
Government, which it accused of not doing enough to control the situ-
ation . 6 
The foreigners living in the outlying districts of Tientsin were 
continually bombarding the consular officials with demands to do some-
thing . Despite pleas by officials the violence continued . However, 
the foreign ministers were themselves subject to criticism. Francis 
Lister Hawkes Pott, a missionary to northern China, claimed that the 
foreign officials were" . .. too dazzled by the glamour of an Oriental 
court, and have never shown the least indication of having grasped the 
situation ." 7 Feelings were running high, and members of the foreign 
4 
North China Daily News, 5 December 1899, 1. p . 
5Tientsin and Peking Times, 13 January 1900 , p. 182. 
6Tientsin and Pekine, Times, 20 January 1900, p. 189. 
7
Francis Lister Pott, The Outbreak in China, Its Causes (New 
York: J. Pott and Co., 1900), p. 84 . 
19 
establishment throughout northern China were becoming quite edgy and 
frightened. By the early part of March 1900, the Boxers were reported 
to be seen actively drilling inside the walls of the Native City. It 
was also reported that a large percentage of governmen t officials were 
secretly encouraging the Boxers . 8 
By the end of May Consul Ragsdale had come to the conclusion that 
the Boxers were becoming a serious threat to the foreign settlements. 
The Native City was by this time seriously affected by Boxer activity. 
Ragsdale was so concerned that on May 27, 1900 he sent a message to 
United States Admiral Louis Kempff, who was Commander of the U. S. 
Flagship, Newark, requesting aid. The message was telegraphed to 
Tangku and from there sent to Taku by tug, reaching the admiral at 
a .m., May 28. Contents of the message were as follows: 
Sir: Part of the railway to Paoting fu destroyed by 
Boxers last evening . Three stations already burned. Des-
truction of main line to Peking threatened, workshops and 
several stations f rom Peking already destroyed. Boxers are 
in control and stations deserted by agents and employees. 
Viceroy promises to send troops t omorrow morning, but I have 
doubts as to their reliability. There is great uneasiness 
here amongst the foreigners, and their situation is most 
serious. Can't you land a force of marines with Maxim or 
quick firing guns? If so, bring by rail if permitted, 
otherwise by river.9 
Admiral Kempff acted immediately and ordered 100 men to go to Tientsin 
under the command of Captain B. H. McCalla. These troops reached 
Tientsin at 10 p.m . May 28 and were the first group of foreign troop 
8
Tientsin and Peking Times, 3 March 1900, p. 2. 
9
u. S. Congress, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, p. 270. 
20 
reinforcements to arrive at the Foreign City. Ragsdale reported that 
the forei gners at Tientsin were so happy to see them that the entire 
foreign population of the city went out to greet them, complete with a 
brass band. Two days later 56 of the 100 were sent on to Peking to help 
protect that city from the Boxers. 10 
On June 8, Consul Ragsdale sent his native writer into the Native 
City to obtain some kind of idea of what was taking ~ace there. On 
his return, the writer reported that there was much excitement within 
the Native City. He told of blacksmiths working around the clock to 
make spears, and that they were receiving three times the amount they 
usually received for them. 11 Consul Ragsdale interpreted his writer's 
report to be a signal of impending crisis. He therefore petitioned 
Admiral Kempf£ for more manpower, which was again granted. But due to 
the seriousness of the situation in Peking, it was decided to send 800 
of the troops at Tientsin to Peking. This was done only after much 
controversy, for many of the foreign body at Tientsin saw a dire need 
for them to r emain. These troops left Tientsin on July 10 under the 
command of Admiral Sir Edward Seymour of the British Naval force . The 
Seymour Expedition immediately aroused the Boxers who so successfully 
harrassed Seymour's troops that they never did reach Peking. 12 
Rumors and fears of an attack by the Boxers on the foreign estab-
lishments were very strong by the second week of June. The situation 
10Ibid., p. 268. 
11
rbid.' p. 270. 
12Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe, p. 70. 
was becoming so serious that the Chinese servants of the British con-
cession had been gradually disappearing since the beginning of the 
month. 13 
At 3 o'clock on the morning of July 15, groups of Boxers made up 
21 
of men and boys set fires in several places on the immediate outskirts 
of the foreign settlements. Groups of these men and boys could be 
seen in the moonlight carrying torches, shavings and oil. As they carne 
near the foreign settlements, they tried to set fire to everything they 
could, the entire time yelling as hideously as possible. 14 All the 
sailors and soldiers available in the foreign quarter went instantly in-
to action. Even Consul Ragsdale and two of his sons, one of whom was 
only fifteen years old, took part in the first engagernent. 15 Most of 
the foreigners were equipped with rifles but in two places the Boxers 
were fired upon with machine guns. The Boxers made a concerted effort 
to raid the Tientsin railroad station which was only a short distance 
from the foreign settlements. The station was guarded at the time by 
a large group of Russians. William McLeish, a news reporter for the 
Tientsin-Peking Times reported that the Russian gunners shot down the 
Boxers "like rabbits." When he dared venture out after the firing 
stopped, McLeish counted several "peaceful villagers" among the dead. 
13
Letter from British Consul Carles to the British Foreign Office, 
28 June 1900, in Great Britain Foreign Office, Correspondence Respect-
ing the Disturbances in China (London: Harrison and Sons, 1901), p. 91. 
14
wuliam McLeish, "Tientsin Beseiged and After the Seige: A 
Daily Record," (unpublished booklet in Hoover Library, Stanford Uni -
versity), p. 1. 
15
u. S. Congress, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, p. 270. 
They had apparently ventured out to inquire about the disturbance and 
were caught in the fire. 16 
22 
The events of June 15 certainly played a major role in the future 
action of the Boxers, and perhaps more important , the Chinese Imperial 
army. Prior to June 15, the Imperial troops were under orders to con-
tain the violence of the Boxers. General Shih-ch'eng Nieh , whose army 
numbered 6,000 and who had been sent out to protect the railroad lines 
from destruction, was called back to Tientsin . His troops arrived 
just a few hours before the Boxers began their fires and rush on the 
foreign settlements.
17 
It was also known that Generals Yu- k'un Ma and 
Ch'ing Sung were in the area of Tientsin and commanded rather large 
numbers of Imperial troops. There was no evidence that any of these 
troops played active roles in the June 15 attack on the foreign settle-
ments, but the killing of several Chinese citizens, several of whom were 
merely peaceful onlookers, adversely affected the attitude of the 
Chinese leaders toward the foreigners. 
The very next night an event took place that was even more impor-
tant in forming Chinese attitudes and policies toward the foreigners. 
For on the night of June 16, 1900 the foreign admirals at Taku made the 
decision to attack the forts off the Taku Bar . An exerpt from the 
minutes of the meeting held by the foreign admirals best typifies their 
attitude toward the entire Boxer situation. The minutes read in part : 
16McLeish, "Tientsin Beseiged and After the Seige ," o . 2. 
17u. S . Congress, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations , p. 270 . 
Figure 2. General map of Tientsin. 
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The Allied Powers, since the beginning of the troubles, 
have, without opposition, sent detachments on land to protect 
their fellow-citizens and the diplomatic Corp against the 
rebels known as the Boxers . At first the representatives of 
the Imperial authority appeared to understand their duties 
and made evident efforts looking to the re-establishment of 
order; but now they clearly show their sympathy with the ene-
mies of the Foreigners, in bringing troops toward the railway 
line and in mining the entrance to the Peiho. These acts 
prove that the Government is forgetting its solemn engagements 
vis-a-vis Foreigners; and as the commanders of the allied 
forces see the necessity of keeping in constant communication 
with the detachments on land, they have decided to occupy 
temporarily by consent or by force, the forts at Taku. The 
latest time for their delivery to the allied forces is fixed 
at two o'clock a.m. on the morning of the 17th. This shall 
be communicated to both the Viceroy at Tientsin and the 
Commander at the Forts.l8 
24 
The commander of the forts ans>~ered that he was bound by the orders 
of his superiors . Just an hour before the time limit expired, the 
Chinese opened fire upon the allied gun boats. The allies answered 
this by sending six gun boats, manned by sailors and marines from 
Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, Austria and Italy to attack the 
forts.
19 
The attack was a success and the allies took control of the 
Taku forts. This was of extreme significance , for now Chinese Imper-
ial troops began to take an active role in the combat against the for-
eigners, whereas before they had for the most part out of active par-
ticipation with the Boxers. As far as Tientsin was concerned, it 
was just a s hort time before Boxers and Chinese troops alike were 
attacking the city. In fact the first shell was fired into the foreign 
city the very day the Taku forts fell. 
18Quoted f rom Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, p. 515. 
19
rbid., p. 516. 
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Tientsin was the location of a relatively large military college, 
situated only 300 yards from the foreign settlements. In the college 
facilities were stored many arms and much ammunition. It was occupied 
by 200 Chinese military students. 2° Consul Ragsdale became particu-
larly disturbed over the threat that the college might hold over the 
foreign settlements. Despite the fact that Generals Ma, Nieh and Sung 
had their troops situated near Tientsin, the allied commanders saw no 
apparent reason to take the college because Impe rial troops had not 
previously acted against foreigners. The consular officials, however, 
were quite alarmed. Led by Consul Ragsdale, a meeting was held by the 
consuls and the commanders and it was decided that the military col -
lege was indeed a threat and must be captured at once. Thus, the order 
was given to begin attack on the college at 3 p. m., June 17. Before 
the attack could be made, however, a shell, which was the beginning of 
the seige of Tientsin, whistled into the foreign settlements . The 
attack on the college was promptly begun . Inside the college itself 
were fifty Chinese military students. They refused to surrender and 
were all killed. 21 It is Consul Ragsdale's opinion, and perhaps ri ght -
fully so, that had the allies waited a mere hour to capture the college , 
the foreign settlement may have been riddled by the eight large Krupp 
guns located in the college. 22 
20




The taking of the college by no means meant that the foreign set-
tlements were secure. In fact just the opposite was true. That first 
shell which dropped into the settlements at approxima t ely 2 :30p . m., 
June 17 was just the first of many the Chinese were to fire into the be-
seiged foreign quarters. Within a half-hour at least 100 more had 
burst on the houses and compounds which were the homes, offices and 
places of business of fue many foreigners who had come to China to take 
part in the rich trade that abounded there . The population also in-
eluded members of the various religious orders, many of whom had re-
cently fled to Tientsin to take refuge from the Boxers. Also approxi-
mately 500 to 600 Chinese refugees who had been converted to Christian-
ity and who were sure to be slaughtered if the Boxers had gotten hold 
of them, had come to Tientsin. 23 The entire population was dependent 
on the protection of mly about 2,500 men, 17,000 of whom were Russians 
who had just arrived at Tientsin on June 17. These men had to maintain 
a defense line eight to ten miles in length. 24 A Russian, Colonel 
Wogack, outranked the other foreign officers and thus assumed command. 
American , Japanese, German, Russian, French and Italian troops accepted 
Wogack's command. Only the British, under the command of a naval offi-
Captain C. W. Baily, were reluctant to follow the Russian's lead. 25 cer, 
Hebert Ho over , who was in China as an engineer for foreign com-
panies , and who happened to be in Tientsin when the first shells were 
23
Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover , 3 vols . (New 
York: McMillan Co., 1951), 1:48. 
24
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25Hoover , Memoirs, 1:49. 
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fired, was asked to organize the Christian Chinese refugees to aid in 
building barricades for protection. The only materials that could be 
found for this were the sacks of sugar, peanuts, rice and other grains 
located in the large warehouses in the foreign city. Approximately 
1 ,000 Chinese Christians were enlisted by Hoover to pile up the sacks of 
material along exposed parts of the town and at cross streets. 26 The 
a ttack of the first day of the seige, June 17, only lasted until approx-
imately 5 p. m. The Austrians, Italians, British and Americans kept 
the enemy at a distance on the southern and western sides of the city . 
The French easily drove back any enemy troops who came their way from 
the north. The wind was blowing in a southerly direction, so the French 
troops set fire to the Chinese suburban homes located between the For-
eign and Native cities. The fire burned furiously all night and helped 
to clear the front of enemy troops. 27 Though the foreigners would 
naturally defend their action as being necessary to guarantee their 
protection, it was another of a long list of examples of complete dis-
regard for the Chinese people. The entire scene on the north of the 
foreign settlements was described as truly an appalling sight. After 
dark, thousands of innocent, peaceful Chinese could be seen rushing 
from their burning houses 11 ••• in the last extremity of panic." Many 
were taking away their household goods in wheel barrows, many in full 
flight trying to flee shot and shell that was being played on them. 28 
26Ibid . 
27
McLeish, "Tientsin Beseiged and After the Seige," pp. 3-4 . 
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Losses of the Chinese the first day of the seige were unknown, but there 
is no doubt that they were heavy among soldiers and the innocent were 
"sac rificed in hundreds if not thousands." The foreigners on the other 
29 
hand had only five killed, several more wounded. One problem facing 
the foreigners when the shelling began was where to put the women and 
children so that they would be safe from attack. It was decided that 
the safest place for them would be in Gordan Hall, a large building 
located in the center of the foreign community . It was being used as 
the city hall at the time of attack. 30 The day of the initial attack, 
Wilfred Newberry, who was on the staff ~Herbert Hoover, climbed onto 
the roof of the Hoover residence to look about. In a pasture about a 
mile out he spotted the dairy herd that had been serving the foreigners . 
Realizing the value of the cattle,he secured a horse and calmly rode 
out to drive the herd back to the settlement, the entire time exposed 
to heavy fire by the Chinese. The herd became valuable later for meat 
and milk for the foreigners. 31 
Shelling and firing with rifle shot by the Chinese continued off 
and on for the next twenty-five days. On Tuesday, June 19, the Russ-
ians, supported by the British held off a Chinese attack on the rail-
road station. The temperature reached 94 degrees that day. Chinese 
shelling generally stopped about mid-afternoon while the Chinese ap-
parently partook of their mid-afternoon tea. 32 The Chinese, with their 
29Ibid., p . 4. 
30
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superior numbers, could no doubt have overrun the foreigners, but at 
no time was an all out attack carried out. If their strategy was 
suspect, the same cannot be said for the Chinese fighting ability . 
Colonel Wogack stated that the Chinese were "f ighting well and more 
skillfully than ever before." 33 The Russian troops bore the brunt of 
the most serious Chinese Charges, and therefore received many casual -
ties. On June 19, ninety Russians were killed or wounded. 34 
With all the fire directed at the foreign city, an increasing 
number of foreigners, both soldiers and civilians were wounded. The 
number of medical people and facilities were extremely small . Only 
two doctors and one nurse were available. A building that had served 
as a settlement club was turned into a hospital by order of Colonel 
Wogack. This facility was soon full of wounded. Mrs . Herbert Hoover 
29 
volunteered to help in the make-shift hospital. Hoover stated that he 
saw little of her during the first period of the seige, except 
when she carne horne occasionally to eat or catch a little sleep ."35 She 
is said to have become quite good at riding her bicycle near the walls 
of buildings, so as to avoid bullets sprayed into the city , although 
one day one of her bicycle tires was punctured by a bullet. 36 
Because of so many stray bullets flying into the foreign city from 
the outside, ricocheting off buildings, st r eets and etc., many of the 
foreigners became suspicious of the Chinese refugees. These people had 
3\bid. 
34.!M.Q_. , p. 6. 
35Hoover, Memoirs, 1:50. 
36Ibid. 
fled to Tientsin for protection and would have been in as horrible 
straits as the fo reigners were they to be captured . They had been 
doing a tremendous service to t he community building barricades to 
help protect the city. 37 Yet, many foreigners became hysterical, and 
30 
immedia t ely picked upon the Chinese in the city . The Chinese Imperial 
Bank was turned into a jail and over 100 Chinese were put in it. 38 
Some were even brought to "trial" with a British captain the self-
appointed "judge." Herbert Hoover tried to intervene but was ordered 
to leave . He immediately rode his bicycle to Colonel Wogack's head-
quarters. Wogack returned with Hoover to the scene of the "trials" 
and ordered them stopped . The Chinese prisoners were turned over to 
Hoover and returned to their quarters. 39 
The feelings against the Chinese did not quickly subside. Arthur 
Barnes was commander of a Chinese regiment trained by the British which 
had been stationed at Wei-ha-wu. His regiment was ordered to Tientsin 
and arrived there shortly after the seige was broken. When he arrived, 
feelings were running so high against the Chinese people, that many of 
the foreigners were against letting the regiment into the city. 40 This 
despite the fact t hat at one point when it appeared a particular gun 
placement was doing extreme damage, a couple of Chinese volunteered to 
enter the Native City to find the gun. Two other Chinese volunteered 
37 McLeish, "Tientsin Beseiged and After the Seige ," p. 7. 
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to try to reach Taku, but neither was heard from again. About fifty 
Chinese helped to provide ammunition for and to move a British twelve-
pounder naval gun. They dragged it from one position to another, de-
pending on where it could be used for greater benefit. Several times 
this was done under heavy fire. Chinese were also responsible for 
washing approximately 400 articles per day which were used in the make-
shift hospital. Chinese women made shirts for the sick and wounded, as 
well as the pillows for the hospital. 41 All in all the Chinese did a 
great, and for the most part unappreciated, service for the foreign com-
munity. 
From the day it began until its end twenty-five days later, the 
shelling into the foreign compound was extremely heavy. Consul Ragsdale 
estimated that 5,000 shells were lobbed into the area . His house was 
struck the first day. He described the shelling as" ... far more 
terrific than any I experienced in the Civil War, and I served under 
General Sherman."
42 
Few civilians were killed because they crawled into 
cellars and stayed there. If one stayed below ground he was reasonably 
safe, since the shells exploded as they passed through the first wall 
they struck, with fragments being blown all over the first room, but not 
passing through to the lower floors. 43 In the street, everyone was ex-
posed. When the firing died down, those in the cellars tried to sleep 
on chairs , the floor or on stairs . Diets for those in the cellar 
41
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consisted of corned beef and biscuits. Damage to property in the area 
was terrific. Household belongings were all destroyed. The force of 
an exploding shell in one house was so great that chair legs were 
found sticking into the ceiling, while all of the furniture was left 
in small pieces . 44 
44Ibid., p. 36 . 
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CHAPTER IV 
ATTACK AND DESTRUCTION 
With the beginning of the attack on the foreign settlements on 
June 15 , all communication with the outside was cut off. It was im-
possible to relay word of the seriousness of the predicament of those 
caught in the seige. On June 19, a young Englishman named James l<a tts 
volunteered to ride from Tientsin to Taku, a distance of 32 miles, 
with dispatches to the British admi rals. 1 After sundown , Watts and 
three Russians lef t Tientsin on their dange rous journey and were some-
how able to reach Taku safely. \.Jatts ' feat was made somewhat easier 
due to the fact that he was extremely familiar with the countryside. 2 
The group ha d several narrow escapes, having to swim the Peiho twice 
to avoid capture. Several times Watts and his Russian comrades were 
shot at.
3 
Also on the night of June 19, a group of nine men were sent 
by boat in an attemp t to reach Taku. Among the nine was R. H. Maclay, 
who was Ragsdale 's interpreter at Tientsin. The boat had proceeded 
only about nine miles down the river when it ran into rocks, apparently 
placed in the river by the Boxers. Those on board were forced to make 
the rest of the journey on foot, but finally reached their destination. 4 
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The success of the two attempts to reach the outside with infor-
mation of the plight of those at Tientsin was to be of extreme impor-
tance. Troops were immediately sent to the aid of the beseiged for-
eigners. On June 22, about 200 United States Marines and 300 Russians 
tried to get to the foreign city by following the railroad from the 
east. They got two miles from their destination when they were am-
bushed and forced to retreat. Three Americans were killed in the 
skirmish. As the original group was retreating, they met 1,500 new 
troops. On June 24, the combined forces were able to make their way 
into the foreign city, much to the relief of all who had been able to 
withstand the shot and shell thrown their way by the Boxers and 
Chinese regulars. The Chinese withdrew from their positions to the 
east of the foreign community and en tered the walled city. This left 
the road to Taku unobstructed. 5 More Russian troops reached Tientsin 
on June 25. The next day, Admiral Seymour and what was left of his 
force was led back into Tientsin by a group of Russians who had helped 
Seymour's group escape from harrassment from the Boxers. 6 
With the opening of the road to Taku on the twenty-fourth, and 
with the arrival of more troops, it became the objective of the inter-
national force at Tientsin not only to stave off the attacks of the 
Chinese, but to take the offensive themselves. On June 26, the large 
and very well equipped arsenal, three miles to the northeast of the 
5
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foreign community, was attacked by Russian troops. They were supported 
by United States Marines as well as British and German troops, and were 
able to capture the arsenal, a serious blow to the Chinese . 7 On July 
4, the Chinese made a strong effort to take the railway station, but a 
combined British, Russian and French force repulsed the attack. 8 Yet 
another attack was made on the railroad station July 11. The fierce 
fighting began at 4:00a.m., with the Chinese actually charging the 
allies with bayonets fixed . A few were able to break through between 
British and French lines, and captured a number of trucks. They were 
eventually driven out, but were said to have shown an" ... astounding 
amount of pluck and tenacity, as well as a considerable amount of 
stra tegy on the part of their officers." 9 Had it not been for the 
quick action of Japanese reinforcements, the Chinese may have been 
successful in taking the railroad station. The Japanese came up quickly 
with bayonets fixed and drove the Chinese back . 10 Though the Chinese did 
make concerted efforts to overrun the railroad station, the contro l of 
which would have given them a great strategical advantage, they never 
made the concen trated effort which could have led to victory over the 
foreigners at Tientsin. The constant shelling, though doing much dam-
age , was not enough to bring victory. And, as seen, as the days went 
by, foreign troop strength continued to increase. The foreigners were 
act ually ready to take the offensive themselves. Much of the Chinese 
7u. S. Congress, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, p. 271. 
8Lander, China and the Allies, 1:171. 
9
rbid., pp. 178-79. 
10
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st r engt h was now centered inside the walls of Tientsin proper. By 
July 11 the re was talk of a concerted a ttack by the various foreign 
powers on the walled city. I n fact the Chinese advancement on the 
railr oad station on the e l ev enth caused a postponement of a planned 
attack .
11 
A council of war made up of generals of the predominant 
powers met and it was decided that the attack would be made on July 
13. 12 The plan of operation for the attack was for the Russians and 
36 
Germans to advance on the east and southeast . At the same time Ameri-
cans , British, French and Japanese forces were to make a combined 
at t ack on the walled city from the south and sout hwest. 13 
The actual at tack commenced early in the morning of July 13. The 
foreign troops which advanced from the south and southwest did so with 
great difficulty . The wall of the native city was well armed by ar -
t illerymen of the Imperial Chinese army . In addition, a large number of 
Boxers were firing with old-fashioned matchlocks and other obsolete 
weapons. The Chinese regulars were equipped with quick firing machine 
guns , and European and American made rifles . The Chinese were also 
using an invention of their own called a gingal. It was an adaptation 
of the breach-loading stock joi ned to a seven foot long barrel. It 
took three men to operate one, but the gingal was deadly accurate at 
long ranges and fired a larger projectile which inflicted huge 
wound s . 14 
11Ibid. 
12Brown, Tientsin to Peking, p. 37. 
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Because he was familiar with the topographic detai l s of the sur-
rounding area, gained from numerous trips on horseback around the city, 
Hoover was asked to accompany the approximately 900 Americans as a 
guide. The Americans, who were aligned to the left of the Japanese , 
immediately came under heavy fire from the Chinese positioned on the 
city walls. The Americans were in an area with little cover except for 
some mounds which formed old Chinese graves . Hoover explained that he 
was" . .. completely scared, especially when some of the marines next to 
me were hit . •• Hoover was una rmed at first but later was given the 
rifle of a fallen marine. 15 The Japanese were in the center of the 
attack, flanked on the right by the British. By 9:00 a . m. they had 
moved as close to the walls as they could. They remained pinned to the 
ground by heavy Chinese fire, as did the rest of the foreign contingent 
on the south. As soon as it grew dark the Japanese started forward 
again. By 2:00 a.m. of the fourteenth, they had reached the wall of 
Tientsin. The resistance of the Chinese was very strong, and when the 
Japanese troops got so close to the walls that they could not be fired 
upon, the Chinese rolled stones and threw bricks down on them. Among 
the Japanese troops were engineers who carried explosives. Ladders 
were carried to help scale the walls. By the time the outer gate of 
the city was blown open, Japanese troops had already scaled the walls, 
some using ladders, others simply going up by hand. Before the inner 
gate was blown open, Japanese troops opened it from within. 16 As the 
1 5Hoover, Memoirs , 1:53. 
16
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KaL ~s opened a flood of forei gn troops, Japanese, British and French 
poured into the town, bayonetting and shooting the Chinese who still 
sniped from inside buildings and made a desperate resistance. 17 
With the defeat of the Chinese within the walls of the native 
city, the entire area of Tientsin was in foreign hands. The once 
38 
thriving community within the walls was now battered beyond recognition, 
the result of the heavy shelling the foreigners had inflicted . To make 
matters worse, almost one third of the city was in flames. The first 
thing the foreigners had to do was put out the fires. 18 Shells had 
done heavy damage to the structural part of the city and to those living 
there as well. Thousands of innocent Chinese were killed. Bodies 
wer e lying everywhere, including those of women and small children. 
Because native homes were built of extremely flammable material, any 
that were hit by shells burst immediately into flames. 19 The foreigners 
obviously gave no heed to the protection of civilians. 
The fact that they had taken the city, and relieved the danger to 
the foreign s ettlements was not enough for the foreigners, neither the 
troops nor their leaders. The Chinese people, who had already paid 
heavily in property and lives from the heavy shelling , were forced to 
continue paying when the fighting stopped. Almost as soon as the gates 
were thrown open, and foreign troops began pouring in, every article of 
17
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portable property of any value was subject to some of the heaviest 
looting as has been seen in history. 
The actual taking of private property of the people of Tientsin 
took place in several forms. First, there was some evidence that Chin-
ese troops and Boxers had done some looting refore foreign troops ar-
rived on the scene. 20 Because they were engaged in heavy fighting and 
were forced to hurriedly flee upon the entry of the foreigners, it is 
quite unlikely that the Boxers or Chinese troops could have taken much. 
It is more likely that this charge was used as a sort of salve to the 
conscience of the many foreigners who took part in the looting. The 
foreigners had also used as an excuse that the city was on fire and 
that the valuables would burn anyway. 21 There was little rationale to 
this since by 9:00 a.m. of July 15, the fires were generally under 
contro1 . 22 A second and quite common form of looting was carried on 
by members of the Chinese working class. Many of them had been working 
for the rich merchants and were paid very little. They had first-hand 
knowledge of where to find goods and therefore had easy access to them . 
The streets of the city on July 15 were full of Chinese with arms 
loaded with bales of cloth, rolls of beautiful silk, satins, brocades, 
coats of silk lined with fur of otter, fox, sable, lamb or mink. Many 
had tied their plunder to the ends of bars, which in turn were carried 
across their shoulders. Some tried to carry a quantity that was ob-
viously much too heavy. 23 
20Lander, China and the Allies, p. 190. 
21Ibid. 
22
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Into the throngs of Chinese car r ying off goods came ye t another 
t ype of looter , this in the form of the foreign soldi ers. The troops 
were des cribed as having "rifles with slings over their shoulders, 
both hands free." 24 The Chinese readily bowed to the demands of the 
foreigner, and gave up any article t he soldier may have wanted. Many 
a soldier could be seen carrying arm loads of valuables. Severa l had 
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so much that they were for ced t o stand guard over it while a friend went 
to get a cart with which to carry the loot away. Throughout the entire 
day of July 14, the looting was carried on. By the next day the hi gh-
est o f ficers of the British troops had decided to take all the loot 
away from those carrying it into the British sector of the foreign 
community . The roads into the settlement were full of m en bringing 
in their plunder. Many had forced Chinese laborers to do their carry-
ing for them . The goods were taken away despite the pleas of protest 
to be disposed of for the common benefit of all the men engaged in the 
captur e of the city. The evening of July 15, the first distribution 
was begun, and only the officers were allowed to participate. 25 This 
example is typical of the overall a ttitud e displayed by the foreigners 
toward the Chinese people . There was total disregard for the feelings 
of the Chinese, with the higher officers approving it only in as much 
as it benefitted them. 
Because troops of so many nationalities took part in the sack of 
Tien tsin, it is interesting to not e which nation's troops took part in 
24Ibid . 
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the looting. There is overwhelming evidence to support the fact that 
men of all nations took part in it. The s tatemen t best summing this 
is, "The soldiers of all nations, none excep ted, disgraced themselves 
alike ."26 But it was not only the fore ign soldiers who took part. By 
noon of July 14, many of the civilians in the foreign city, upon learn-
ing of the capture of Tientsin, ventured into the city. Many were 
quite familiar with the area and were able to find the more valuable 
articles to steal. Many came to recompense themselves for losses they 
felt they r eceived at the hands of the Chinese. 27 They of course did 
not stop to r eal ize that it was because of their encroac hme nt s that the 
Chinese attacked in the first place. The British civilians were sa id 
to have been more successful looters than the troops, probably because 
they knew the location of the more valuable jewelry and large s ums of 
28 
money . 
By the second and third day after the fall of Tientsen, the fever -
ish pitch of the l ooting had subsided. Things in the foreign se ttle-
ment began to return to normal, except that many of the homes and build-
i ngs were badly damaged during the seige , and it wo uld take time for 
repairs to be made. The fo reign sector was filled with officers and 
service men of all nationalities. I t was described as a city present-
ing "a kaliedascope picture of varied uniforms and mixed troops of 
many nations. " 29 Mostly good fellowship prevailed among the different 
26Lander, China and the Allies, 1:190- 91. 
27Davis, "Looting of Tientsin , 11 p. 863. 
28
oix, The World's Navies, p. 179. 
29 Casserly, The Land of the Boxers , p. 26. 
nationalities. The bond of a common language drew British and Ameri-
cans quite close together. Speaking to the Japanese proved to be the 
most difficult for those of the other nations because the Japanese 
language was so much different. 30 
In the suburbs and Tientsin proper , things were very far from 
normal. The immediate concern was to cremate the hundr eds of bodies 
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of Chinese who had died in the foreign attack. Prisoners who had been 
captured by foreign troops were forced to gather bodies into heaps , 
cover them with doo r s and other materials taken from Chinese houses and 
then to set them afire. 31 Those Chinese who were still alive were 
forced to either have in their possession home-made flags of one of the 
foreign nations or a pass. Most of the Chinese made simple replicas 
of the Japanese flag, since it was easiest to imitate . Very few had 
U. S. or British flags in their possession. 32 Any Chinese found in the 
city without a flag or a pass was made prisoner or shot . 33 For days 
prisoners were executed, none of whom received any semblance of a trial. 
Many were simply villagers who were driven to brigandage because their 
houses were burned and a food supply was non-existant. Others were the 
vi ctims of informers, who to gain a small reward, denounced innocent 
people . Often the prisoners were led in gro up s , pigtails tied together, 
to the place of execution. In most cases a Chinese acted as 
)Qlbid., pp. 21-22. 
31
srown, Tientsin to Peking , p. 44 . 
32
oix, The World's Navies , p. 184 . 
33Lande r, China and the Allies, p. 215 . 
executioner, with white soldiers as witnesses. A sword was used, and 
the "convicted" were beheaded. 34 
It is quite obvious that the Chinese people were the real losers 
in and around Tientsin during the early part of the Boxer Rebellion. 
The foreigners didn't even help those Chinese who were wounded. Red 
Cross workers, who entered Tientsin after the foreign attack, ignored 
injured Chinese and many died from want of assistance. 35 Property 
losses when all added together were astounding among even the poorer 
classes . Added to this was the fact the means of livelihood of all 
classes of Chinese was seriously disrupted. Even with all these ad -
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versities, perhaps the biggest blow of all to a people who had governed 
themselves for centuries was the announcement that the foreign generals 
had agreed that t hey would govern the city of Tientsin and its vici nity 
A telegram from the British Consul to the Marquis of Salisbury, July 
17, 1900 told of the meeting of the "allied commanders" who agreed to 
appoint a military government. 36 It is this government that forms the 
final chapter of foreign dominance in Tientsin. 
34
casserly, The Land of the Boxers, p . 28 . 
35Lander, China and the Allies, p. 216. 
36Telegram from Consul Carles to Marquis of Salisbury, 17 July 
.1900 in Great Britain Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the 
Disturbances in China, p . 114. 
CHAPTER V 
FOREIGN RULE IN TIENTSIN 
The institution that was to become the ruling body of Tientsin 
and eventually its surrounding area has been called, "One of the most 
remarkable military dictatorships ever organized. "1 The institution 
was the Tientsin Provisional Government or T. P. G. for shor t. The 
government was composed of a council made up of three members, al l 
having equal power. The three members were elected by a vote of 
the mili.tary commanders of the allied powers operating in Chihli 
Province . The council derived its authority from all the powers, and 
enjoyed absolute independence in dealing with the territory under its 
jurisdiction . It was pledged to comply as nearly as possible to all 
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requests addressed to it by either the commanders of the allied forces 
or by the consuls representing the foreign powers. 2 
In looking at the provisions the T. P. G., it is obvious that 
the integrity of China, both of its government and people were totally 
ignored. No respect was shown the Chinese Government. Though the 
foreigners had attacked and defeated a combined Boxer-Government force 
in Tientsin, they had not defeated China. Yet the T. P. G. was set up 
as if China ' s gove rnment had somehow vanished from the earth. Only the 
1
otto D. Rasmussen, Tientsin; An Illustrated Outline History 
(Tientsin : The Tientsin Press Limited, 1925), p. 221. 
2Great Britain Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting Distur-
bances in China, p . 157. 
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property of Chinese officials was to be protec ted, but any power those 
officials may have had was i gnored. Consequent l y the people were 
placed in a position of being subjec ted to a government completely 
different from their accustomed form of rule . The T. P. G. is the 
crowning example of the lack of respec t shown by the foreigners to the 
Chinese . As originally conceived, the T. P . G. had jurisdiction to 
include only the area around Tientsin as far as the mud wall. Excep-
tions were the foreign concessions, and any other organization or 
institution previously controlled by foreign powers. 3 
The first council of the T. P. G. assembled on July 30, 1900. The 
original council was made up of Colonel Wogack, a Russian, Britain's 
Lieutenant Colonel Bower and Colonel Aoki of Japan . 4 Adding insult to 
the Chinese, the meeting was held in the palace o r "Yamen" of the 
Viceroy of Chihli Province . The yamen became the headquarters of the 
T. P. G. 5 By October, 1900, an agreement was reached to add three 
members to the rouncil, one each from France , the United States and 
Germany. In November the new members took their place on the council. 
They were the German Major Von Falkenhayn, French Colonel Arlabosse 
and U. S . Major Foote . Major Foote served only unt il May 10, 1901, when 
the withdrawal of United States troops from Tien t sin necessitated his 
resignation . By then another member had been added . On April 15, 1901, 
3Ibid . 
4
oecennial Reports, 1892-1901 , pp . 581-82 , 
5
c. L. Poor, "Tientsin Today," Har per's l<eekly , 20 October 1900 , 
p. 986 . 
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Commander Cassanova was appointed as a representative from Italy. 6 Thus 
each of the major powers was eventually represented on the council. 
A myriad of problems faced the T. P. G. It had to deal with the 
extreme chaos which resulted from the capture of the native sectors. 
Trade, which had been the life line of the city, was virtually at a 
standstill. Shops were void of goods with which to trade, generally 
due to the looting that followed the foreign attack. Even the necessi-
ties of life were at a premium. Fear had driven most businessmen and 
customers a like from the city. The tremendous struggle to take Tientsin 
had resulted in serious health hazards. Bodies lay everywhere, build-
ings and streets had been destroyed. The city and its suburbs were 
in a serious state of disarray and turmoil. 7 The fact that the T. P. G. 
was a foreign military government more difficult to successfully re-
solve . One of the first things the T. P. G. did was to set up a 
police system to maintain order in the area. Soldiers of the various 
foreign powers made up the backbone of the police force. Many Chinese 
were added to the force.
8 
The nat ive policemen were stationed about the 
city and were to report any serious problems to the foreign police, who 
then dispatched troops to take care of the problem. The native city 
was organized into four districts, each district having a foreign cen-
tral police headquarters and a detachment of foreign troops, patrolled 
like the Chinese police. 9 The police system was eventually expanded to 
6
necennial Reports. 1892-1901, p. 582. 
7Ibid. 
8
rbid., p. 585. 
9
Poor, "Tientsin Today," p. 986. 
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include the waterways around Tientsin . Thievery in the shipping in-
dustry had a lways been a problem. To combat it, sixty Chinese police-
men and about the same number of Italian sailors were appointed to 
patrol the waterways. All were under the command of a captain of the 
Italian navy. 10 
Another early thrust of fue T. P. G. was a campaign to clean up 
and fix up the city and to give it a better system of drainage. In an 
attempt to improve the pitiful conditions of the Chinese in Tientsin, 
almshouses were established and some aid was provided to Chinese who 
could not make their livings the way they had before the foreign take-
ove r. Some were put to work by the T. P. G. in jobs designed to aid 
in the clean-up of the city and to build the new drainage faciliti es . 
Street improvemen ts were also an endeavor undertaken by the T. P. G. 
Along the banks of the Peiho and Grand Canal, a wide, paved boulevard 
was const ructed. The new road offered excellent accommodations for 
traffic to and from the city. A wide thoroughfare was also built a-
round the city. The two existing main roads of the town were widened 
and straightened, and many lesser roads were improved. The T. P. G. 
also was responsible for the installation of a new system of water 
works. Chinese and foreign capitalists were granted a franchise to in-
stall and operate the new system. The T. P. G. attached several con-
ditions to the franchise . Fire hydrants had to be installed at inter-
vals of 225 meters. The price of the water could not exceed that of 
the native city of Shanghai. Also a filtering system had to be 
10
oecennial Reports , 1892-1901, p. 585. 
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installed and maintained. The result was a clear water surply that the 
natives had never known before. 11 Though the improvements were bene-
ficial to the Chinese, it is obvious that many were undertaken to aid 
the foreign interests in Tientsin. An example is the improvement made 
on roads which were to facilitate the movement of trade goods in and 
about Tientsin. 
The degree of authority which the T. P. G. held over the Chinese 
people is evident in the judicial power in Tientsin . The T. P. G. had 
the power to inflict fines upon the natives, confisca te their property 
and punish them with banishment or death. 12 The police made up largely 
of foreigners could make the arrests, and the cases were heard in 
courts presided over by foreigners. There is little wonder that at 
first the Chinese were terrified by the T. P. G. and that they dis -
trusted it.
13 
But the T . P. G. quite early won the confidence of the 
foreign powers. As early as November 1900, the council applied for and 
received an extension to its jurisdiction. The council extended the 
territorial limits of the T. P. G. in a decree which stated: 
The jurisdiction of the council shall extend over the city 
of Tientsin, and over the surrounding territories where the 
establishment of the Provisional Government shal l appear neces-
sary to assure the security of the city of Tien tsin, to complete 
the public works, to maintain the communications by the rivers 
and canals, to protect the markets where the city of Tientsin 
secures its provisions, and to protect goods in transit to and 
from the interior .l4 
11
rbid .• pp . 584-85. 
12
creat Britain Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting Disturb-
ances in China , p. 158. 
13Tientsin and Peking Times, 15 June 1901, p . 22 . 
14
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The council thereby extended its rule to include a strip of country 
on both sides of the Peiho, from the Gulf of Pechili to a line about 
twenty-five kilometers to the west and northwest of Tientsin. The 
entire area was divided into five districts, of which Tientsin was one . 
The four outlying districts were each placed under control of a mili-
tary officer who had the designation of Chief of the District . The 
chiefs of the four districts organized and superintended a staff inde-
pendent of that of the metropolitan district. The chief of the dis-
trict wielded more nearly absolute power than any one official within 
the city, although he was at all times under the orders of the T. P. G. 
Council. 
15 
Thus the scope of the foreign control was expanded to in-
elude a much larger area and many more Chinese were forced to live 
under the rule of a foreign power. 
One of the most unpopular actions of the T . P. G. was its decision 
to carry out the demolition of the wall surrounding the native city. 
The Chinese natives strenuously opposed this action . Leaders of the 
gentry class petitioned the 1'. P. G. to leave the wall so that they 
would not be subjected to the disgrace of living in a city without a 
wall. The reason the T . P. G. gave for wanting to tear the wall down 
were military and hygienic. The contention was that the wall was in 
such a location that the foreign concessions were always in a position 
to be threatened by gunfire from the wa11. 16 Also, many Chinese were 
living near the wall in wretched lean-to huts, which the T. P. G. 
15Ibid. 
16
rbid . , p. 584. 
wanted to remove. The demolition of the wall was a gigantic task but 
was carried out with surprising speed. Once the Chinese accepted the 
fact that the wall was coming down, they caused few problems to the 
completion of the project. 17 Nevertheless it was another example of 
the foreign powers ignoring the traditions of the Chinese people to 
promote their own causes. The people living near the wall were com-
pensated with lots in the western part of the city. 18 They were not, 
however, given any means with which to build a shelter on their new 
land. The result was that they lost what little shelter they had had 
50 
before. It is obvious that the tearing down of the wall was a reaction 
to the experiences of the seige. One cannot help but suspect a degree 
of punitiveness on the part of the T. P. G. The hygienic reason for 
tearing the wall down was particularly weak, as the run-down shacks 
could have been removed without demolishing the entire wall. 
To run as extensive a program as the T. P. G. meant the necessity 
of large amounts of funds. The income of the government was derived 
chiefly from domestic duties that it imposed. These included dues on 
goods coming to and from Tientsin. House taxes, plus the sale of 
shop and boat licenses helped provide funds. 19 Although as early as 
June 1901, there was some movement to end T. P. G. rule, many Chinese 
had come to accept the new government. Many Chinese in the gentry 
17
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class and many traders, who had benefitted financially from T. P. G. 
measures, urged that the T. P. G. continue its rule. 20 There were also 
some Chinese who criticized the T. P. G. as being too lenient in deal -
ing with criminals. Most ruffians were sentenced to hard labor, and it 
was felt by some that a more severe punishment was in order. 21 By mid -
year 1902, the programs initiated by the T. P. G. were either completed 
or well underway. Tientsin and its surroundings had returned to normal, 
and it became increasingly obvious that the T. P. G. was beginning to 
outlive its usefulness. Thus, August 15, 1902 the T. P. G. conducted 
its final meeting and its power was returned to Chinese authority. 22 
The terms under which the T. P. G. transferred its power presented 
some rather delicate problems. It must be kept in mind fuat this 
power had been the creation of military men in occupation of Chinese 
territory. The problem facing the T. P. G. was how to resolve the 
fact that its actions of over two years should be recognized by 
Chinese authority, when the Chinese again took cont rol of Tientsin . 
Persons who had assisted the government had to be protected from any 
natural resentment that Chinese authorities may have held for them. 
Also the T. P. G. wanted to insure that works begun by it would be con-
tinued by the Chinese. These were the crucial points to be negotiated 
in releasing the T. P. G. from power. 23 The foreign powers dealt with 
the Chinese concerning the points of negotiation by extending the 
20
Tientsin and Peking Times, 15 June 1901, p. 22. 
21
Tientsin and Peking Times, 2 November 1901, p . 1 . 
22
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fiction that the foreign powers had never been at war wit h China , but 
were only an i nt ernal uprising. The T. P . G. looked upon itself as 
simply a means to which this was partially accomplished . Using this 
logic, the powers attempted to get the approval of it s actions by the 
Chinese authority. 
The exact proposal of the council "for the rendition of the govern-
ment to the Chinese authorities" were as follows: 
Given that the Allied Powers have always maintained that 
they have not been at war with China, the Provisional Govern-
ment ought to be regarded as having acted for the Chinese 
Government, and the Chinese Government ought to recognize the 
validity of all of its acts, as if they have been done in the 
name of the Imperial Chinese Autho r ities themselves.24 
The Chinese were in no position to quarrel, no matter how hypocritical 
the proposition may have been. To regain their sovereignty from the 
foreign powers was their objective. Thus the T. P. G. disbanded leav-
ing the 2,758,651. 18 of Chinese taels that were left in the T. P. G. 
treasu r y t o the Chinese authorities. 25 
What effect did the T . P. G. have on Tientsin? There is little 
doubt that it did bring some physical and economic benefits to the 
vicinity . Many Chinese certainly received some improvements in their 
living. Yet there is little doubt that the T . P. G. caused serious 
psychological damage to the Chinese people in and a round Tientsin, who 
for over two years were forced to live under the authority of a foreign 
power . There was certain to be a resulting la:::k of confidence in the 
old order to control the destiny of China. And though the T. P. G. 
24Ibid. 
25Ibid., p. 588. 
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did not actively participate, its rule coincided with the greatest land 
grab by foreign powers near Tientsin in Chinese history . If one ac -
cepts the T. P. G.'s own proposition that it "acted for the Chinese 
Government" in Tientsin, then full responsibility for the land grab 
must be placed on its shoulders. Ulterior motives of the European 
countries developed as early as November 1900. Russia and Belgium were 
proposing extensions of their concessions, and later Germany , France 
and Austria did the same. Japan also got into the act. 26 Americans 
denounced this as a "grab game,•• but U . S. Minister to China, E. H. 
Conger , acknowledged that it would be, "Advantageous to us in many ways 
to have an American concession at Tien tsin." He admitted, however , 
that it wasn't practical because the United States had too few citizens 
and too little money in the area. 27 Thus the United States took the 
role of guardian of Chinese territorial integrity. Its efforts were 
of little consequence in the vicinity of Tientsin, as by the end of 
February 1901, all available land around Tientsin had been seized 
by the land hungry powers, except for a small tract that had once formed 
the American concession. 28 The T . P. G. obviously did little to act in 
the interest of the Chinese even though it was supposedly acting "for 
the Chinese Government." It is inconceivable that one can truthfully 
say that the T. P. G. was good for China. On the contrary , it did very 
26
Paul H. Clements, The Boxer Rebellion; A Political and Diplo-
matic Review ( NEoW York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1915; reprint ed., 
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28Ibid., p. 58. 
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little for Chjna, and has to be looked upon as a detriment to the con-
tinuation of China in its old tradition. 
The actual ceremonies of the transfer of authority was made on 
August 15 , 1902. A huge, official function was made of the transfer. 
Yuan Shih-kai, who had become the Viceroy of Chihli Province, was pres-
ent. The allied generals who authorized the transfer were French 
General Lefevre, Major General Rorsheidt of Germany, Major General 
Creagh of Britain , Japanese General Akiyama, and Lieutenant Colonel 
Ameylio of Italy. Several Chinese officials were present to be in 
charge of the proceedings for the Empire. 29 With the end of the T. P. 
G., China again ruled Tientsin. But the T. P. G. ' s effects were to 
be felt for many years to come, most of which were negative to China 
rather than positive. 
29
Rasmussen, Tientsin; An Illustrated Outline History, p. 230. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUS ION 
The great trading that was once so prominent in Tientsin was 
thoroughly disrupted by the events of 1900. The loss in trade by the 
United States, one of the lesser trading powers, was described as 
"almost inculcuable."
1 
The Chinese, though losing the battle in 
Tientsin, had seriously disrupted the major foreig n influence in 
Tientsin. The fact that the trade was of so much importance to the 
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powers goes far in explaining why the foreigners were willing to fight 
so fiercely to win victory. Once the seige had been raised, it would 
have been a simple matter to remove the consular officials, mission-
aries , businessmen and all others who were placed in jeopardy by the 
Chinese. The powers, however, seemed interested only in protecting 
their trade and extending the control they already held i n China. 
The powers on the surface appeared to cooperate well with each 
other and act as one unit , the fact remains that there was little trust 
held for each other. The British and Russians were particularly sus~ 
picious and envious of each other. Japan was also wary of the Russian 
moves in the area of Tientsin , and saw them as an attempted chaos there . 
Japan felt this chaos would aid Russias advances in China. 2 The United 
1
u. S. Congress, House, Commercial Relations of the United States 
with Foreign Countries During the Year 1901, H. Doc. 320, 57th Cong., 
2d sess . , p. 805. 
2
Thompson, China and the Allies, pp. 140-41. 
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States, though seeming to be the protectorate of Chinese integrity, 
looked somewhat longingly at a possible concession in Tientsin. With 
so many powers with roots in Tientsin, it was inconceivable that there 
would be a mass pullout, as none of the powers was willing to see 
another make gains at its own expense. 
The real losers in this power struggle were the Chinese. The 
defeat of its army in Tientsin was a serious blow to the prestige of 
its government, as was the establishment of the Tientsin Provisional 
Government. But it was the people of Tientsin who suffered most. The 
loss of lives and property was astounding. Seldom were the Chinese 
peasants treated with any respect by the foreigners. Shells were 
lobbed with no heed as to whether they landed m a military objective 
or a peasant's hut. There was indiscriminate shooting both during the 
seige and in the capture of Tientsin City. People were executed with 
only a mere semblance of a trial. The T. P. G. helped the area in 
many respects, yet its major motive was restoration of the trade that 
had once flourished in the area. And during its rule, China lost 
more land to the powers in the vicinity of Tientsin than at any pre-
vious time. Little respect was shown the Chinese government except 
in those cases where it would have been a benefit to the foreign cause . 
These are the major conclusions that can be drawn from the study 
of TientsJn in 1900. It is evident that these situations existed be-
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General Regulations for the Administration of the City of Tientsin 
THE town of Tien-tsin having been occupied by the allied troops, 
it has been decided to constitute a Provisional Administration under 
t:he form of "Council of the Provisional Government of the Chinese city 
of Tien-tsin." 
The jurisdiction of this Council will extend over the city of 
Tien-tsin itself and over the surrounding territories as far as the 
mud wall, with the exception of--
1. The foreign Concessions: German, English, French, and Japanese 
2. The arsenals, camps, railways, telegraphs, and other military 
institutions already occupied by the allied troops. 
The Provisional Government will deal with the following questions: 
1. The re-establishment of order and security within the bound-
aries of the city on the territory subject to their jurisdiction. 
2. The ordering of sanitary measures in the city, on this terri-
tory, and in the surrounding country, in order to prevent epidemic 
and other diseases. 
3. They will facilitate the quartering of the allied forces, 
and will procure them provisions and means of transport, beasts of 
burden, carts, boats, coolies, &c. 
4. They will draw up an inventory of, and will take the measures 
necessary for preserving, the moveable and immoveable property belong-
ing to the Chinese Government, as well as that of private individuals 
left behind by them. 
5. They will take measures to prevent famine among the natives . 
The Provisional Government will be represented by a Council com-
posed of three members enjoying equal rights, elected by a meeting of 
the Military Commanders of the allied Powers operating in Pechili. 
The Council, deriving its authority from all the Powers, will 
enjoy absolute independence on the territory confided to it, and will 
comply as far as possible with all requests addressed to it either by 
the Commanders of the allied forces or by the Consuls of the foreign 
Powers. 
In case of a difference of opinion arising between the Council and 
one of the Commanders of the allied forces, or between the Council and 
one of the Consuls, the question will be submitted to the arbitration 
of the assembled Commanders of the allied forces or to that of the 
Consular Body, according to the character of the dispute. If an ar-
rangement cannot be come to by this procedure the difference will be 
submi tt ed to the decision of their respective Governments. 
The Council will have the right 
1. To draw up and publish Regulations upon questions interesting 
the Provisional Government. 
2. To impose upon the natives duties , taxes, and contributions , 
and to collect the taxes due to the Chinese Government. 
3. To seize or take under its control all the securities, as well 
as the documents which shall be found in the Government buildings and 
in private houses deserted by their owners. 
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4. To make use, according to its requirements, of all the moveable 
property belonging to the Government , with the exception of that be-
longing to the Military Administration, and to proceed to the sale of 
the confiscated personal and real property of the native inhabitants . 
5. To employ the sums placed at the disposal of the Council for 
the necessary expenditure. 
It is understood that an advance of funds shall be made to the 
Council by the Powers to which the members of the Provisional Govern-
ment belong, with a view to meet the first expenditure before the 
finances of the city have been put in order. The sums will be repaid 
out of the first money available from the collection of taxes and dues. 
Besides their rights of poli ce , the Provisional Government will also be 
invested with the judicial power, They will, in consequence , be able 
to inflict fines upon the natives, to confiscate their goods, and, if 
necessary, punish them with banishment or the death penalty. As regards 
foreigners, both military and civilian, t he Council will only exercise 
police rights over them. Foreigners who contravene the Regulations will 
be arrested, and a record of their examination will be drawn up immed-
iately. They will then, within twenty-four hours, be handed over to 
their own military or Consular autorities. 
The Provi sional Government will be assisted, under their control, 
by the following Departments, which will be under their control: 
1. General chancery of the Council . 
2 . Police Department. 
3 . Sanitary Department . 
4. Treasury. 
5 . Administration of the property of the Government as well as 
of tha t abandoned by private persons . 
6 . Military section . 
7. Judi cial section. 
8. Office of public food suppl ie s. 
Besides these general Departments each member of the Council has 
a private office. 
The functions of each of these Depa r tments are defined by their 
designations. As regards the details of the Depar t men t, they will be 
determined by special instructions of the Council . 
Each administrative section is composed of a Head of Department 
and of such a numbe r of employes as may be required . 
The personnel of the Administration may be chosen among soldiers 
and c ivilians. 
All persons attached to the service of a foreign Gover nmen t who 
shall be members of the Administration of Tien- tsin will keep their 
present posts , as well as the additional salary, in the same pr opor-
tions as t hat allotted to those who ar e members of t he Provisional 
Government without occupying an official position. 
There will be t hree categories of sa l aries, according to t he 
position of fue f unctionaries: 
Head of Department , 800l. a-year. 
Depu ty head or assistants, 600 l . a - yea r . 
63 
Secondary employes , 300Z. a-year 
The salaries of the nat ive pers onnel will be fixed by the Council. 
Tien- tsin, the lOth (23rd) July, 19001 
1From Great Britain Foreign Office , Correspondence Respec ting 
the Disturbances in China (London: Harrison and Sons, 1961), pp. 157-
59 . 
